This paper investigates how the structure of the informal communication network that results from efforts to coordinate task interdependence between design teams in complex product development projects moderates the effect of task interdependence on inter-team communication. Drawing on theoretical mechanisms from the social network and knowledge transfer literature, as well as on recent empirical advances in exponential random graphs models (ERGMs) of social networks, we examine how the presence of a common third party in the communication network affect the likelihood of technical communication between interdependent teams designing the components of a large commercial aircraft engine. Although task interdependence has a strong and significant effect on the likelihood of communication between teams, this effect is moderated by the presence of common-third parties. The nature of this moderation depends on the position of the common third party within the triadic communication structure. When the common third party seats in the middle of a communication chain between the potential source and the potential recipient of technical communication, its presence increases the likelihood of communication between these two teams. However, when the communication between the source and recipient can trigger cyclic exchanges between the three teams, the presence of the third party reduces the likelihood of communication between the two interdependent teams, increasing the risk of coordination disruptions. We discuss the implications of our findings to the literature of intraorganizational networks in new product development.
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By enhancing our understanding of how common third parties in communication networks may affect the alignment between inter-team communication and task interdependence in product development efforts our paper has implications for organization theory and practicing managers. From a theoretical viewpoint, our results call the attention on the paradox that the same communication network that emerges to help teams coordinate their task interdependence may lead some teams to neglect exchanging information about some of those interdependencies. In doing so, our findings also open venues for a more systematic analysis of how the endogenous dynamics of informal communication networks may influence the effectiveness of such networks in facilitating coordination between interdependent intraorganizational actors. From a practical standpoint, our findings highlight the importance of attending to situations where, contrary to what is often assumed by managers and engineering scholars (Cataldo et al. 2006 , Olson et al. 2009 ), task interdependence may not trigger the informal communication patterns necessary to coordinate these tasks.
COORDINATION MECHANISMS IN NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT

ORGANIZATIONS
Formal organizations seek to structure tasks in ways that minimize coordination requirements and put in place a number of formal mechanisms to meet these requirements (Thompson 1967 , Galbraith 1973 . In the specific case of engineering organizations developing complex products, efforts to reduce coordination requirements focus on minimizing the number and complexity of the interdependencies between product components without compromising product functionality (Baldwin and Clark 2000) .
Formal coordination mechanisms involve decisions such as assigning the responsibility for designing product components to design teams, grouping these teams into subsystem groups led by a manager, and introducing special teams to facilitate horizontal coordination across teams designing related components.
Yet, formal mechanisms are seldom sufficient to adequately coordinate interdependent tasks. This insufficiency prompts the emergence of informal communication between interdependent teams, which exchange task-related information that helps them coordinate their work (Nadler and Tushman 1997, 8 
MISMATCHED INTERDEPENDENCIES AND COMMON THIRD PARTIES
The possibility that the communication network that emerges to coordinate task interdependence between teams could itself affect the likelihood of communication between those teams is consistent with our knowledge of the endogenous mechanisms that shape communication networks, and particularly, with the effect of common third parties in such networks (Contractor et al. 2006 , Robins et al. 2009 ). The central idea behind these mechanisms is that the communication between the third party and each of the two interdependent teams can affect their propensity to exchange information regarding their own task interdependence. To clarify how these mechanisms operate, we need to examine the different triadic configurations involving the three actors. i) or flows of task-related information between the respective teams. We focus solely on directed ties to simplify the discussion and to remove the potentially confounding effects of reciprocal ties, although these are controlled for in our empirical analyses. In addition, in our analysis we control for the possibility that the communication ties with the common third party k may (or may not) be accompanied by task interdependence flow. Yet, for the purpose of our argument we assume that if communication flow occurs is because the recipient used such information to carry out its design tasks.
Insofar as communication ties help coordinate existing task interdependence, the presence of the interdependence x ij should trigger an informal communication tie y ij through which team j sends relevant information to team i. This communication tie would "match" the exogenous interdependence between these two teams. Yet, the presence of the common third party k in the local communication structure may affect the likelihood of the communication tie y ij . In principle, the mechanisms typically associated with triadic closure should increase the baseline tendency to form a communication tie y ij that results from the underlying interdependence tie x ij , irrespective of the direction of the communication ties with the common third party. In other words, the common relationship with k should make it easier for i to seek information from j and compel j to respond favorably to such a request, or even proactively sending this information in some cases. The mechanisms typically invoked include the role of the common third party k in facilitating mutual awareness and trust between i and j (Simmel, 1950; Granovetter 1973 Granovetter , 1985 Burt 2005) , as well as j's reputational concerns in the event that k becomes aware of its non-cooperative behavior towards i (Coleman, 1990; Raub and Weesie 1990) . These considerations are supported by empirical evidence. Research on knowledge transfer confirms that the presence of common third parties facilitates the source transferring knowledge to the recipient (Reagans and McEvily 2003) and the recipient acquiring knowledge, even when the knowledge exchange occurs across organizational boundaries (Tortoriello et al. 2012 ). Yet, the tendency towards triadic closure, and hence the effect of the common third party on the likelihood of a communication tie between the two focal teams may vary depending on the position this party occupies in the local communication structure, as defined by the specific information flows between the focal teams and the common third party. Specifically, we will argue that in some cases the position that the common third party occupies in the local structure may create incentives to discourage the communication between the two focal teams, despite their interdependence. This could prevent the closure of the triad in the communication network, leaving the interdependence x ij without the corresponding communication tie y ij and generating a "mismatched" interdependence, which may disrupt inter-team coordination. To understand how this may be the case, we need to focus on how the structural differences across the four triads shown in Figure 1 may affect the role that the third party may play in inducting or inhibiting the communication between the two other interdependent parties. We will argue that such differences are rooted in the directionality of the communication flows between the third party k and the two other members of the triad (Robins et al. 2009 ).
Triad A is a classic transitive triad (Robins et al. 2009 ). In this triad, the third party k receives information from j and sends information to i. The transitivity logic that operates in most communication networks suggests that this local structure should facilitate the emergence of trust and awareness between i and j, making j more likely to send information to i. The fact that j provides information to k and k does it to i should also make k more aware of i's need for information from j. In knowledge transfer terms, a common third party that understands the information provided by the source (team j) and also understands the needs of the recipient of information (team i) is likely to facilitate the transfer of information between i and j because it can help the source framing its outputs and the recipient acquiring the knowledge it receives McEvily 2003, Tortoriello et al. 2012 ). Thus, this local structure allows k to reduce any friction that might exist against exchanging information from j to i, which should encourage i and j to communicate, further increasing trust-enhancing properties of the triad. The mechanism operating here is similar to Burt's (2001) argument on the effect of common third parties on trust and reputation, whereby the common third party "amplifies" the strength of the relationship between the other two members of the triad (see also Burt, 1995) . While it is possible that k might also act as intermediary between i and j, this indirect information is unlikely to completely substitute for first-hand information obtained directly from the source in complex product design projects like the one studied in this paper. In sum, both the trustenhancing properties of transitive triads and the ability of the third party (based on its exchanges of information with both i and j) to facilitate conditions for the ease transfer of information from j to i increase the likelihood that j would send technical information to i, closing the communication triad.
While triad A is a classic transitive triad, triads B and C represent other types of transitive triads in which the common third party either receive or sends information to the other two interdependent teams in the triad (Robins et al. 2009 ). In triad B, the common third party k receives information from both i and j, but does not send information to either. In triad C, the common third party k sends information to both i and j, but does not receive information from either. This local structure does not create incentives for k to either encourage or discourage the communication between the two interdependent teams i and j because the communication between i and j is less likely to affect k's work in any discernible way. In triad B, team k is downstream of the decisions of both i and j, so once k receives information from them, it can carry on with its task without worrying about what i and j do. Analogously, in triad C, k likely occupies an upstream position in the design chain, so the decisions k makes cascade down to i and j, which need to adjust their work accordingly but such adjustment should not impact the work of k. Hence, the presence of a common third party in the communication network is less likely to significantly modify the baseline tendency for the two interdependent teams i and j to communicate in triads B and C.
In triad D, the directionality of the information flows with the common third party is the exact opposite to the flows in triad A. Team j receives information from k, which in turns receives information from i. If team j then sends information to i, they would form a communication pattern characterized by cyclic triadic closure, which is fundamentally different from the other three triads in Figure 1 . If i makes changes in design to align it with j's design, these changes may end up forcing modifications in k's design, which could in turn cause j to further adjust its design. Such a cyclic pattern may cause the three teams to 12 become involved in an endless chain of information exchanges like the one depicted in triad D. Although cyclic interdependence patterns are not infrequent in new product development efforts Eppinger 1997, Mihm et al. 2003) , they are difficult to manage and increase the likelihood of errors (Sosa et al. 2013) . Given difficulties associated with cyclic communication in triads, the third party k is unlikely to induce j to send information to i, because this information may end up forcing k to make further adjustments to its own design. On the contrary, once k has received information from i and understand how i's design can affects its own, k has an incentive to encourage i and j to "freeze" (or even neglect) their task interdependence to prevent design changes that may lead to subsequent rework in k's design. Because the cycle would also affect i and j, these teams may also prefer to "freeze" their interface to avoid triggering the cyclic communication involving k. This approach to manage iterative problem solving has been recognized in the new product development literature (Eppinger et al. 1994 , Mihm et al. 2003 . When a set of tasks are related to each other in a cyclic manner, the teams involved may decide to "cut" the communication cycle by removing, freezing, or making assumptions about one of the interdependencies in the cycle, which allows them to carry out their activities in a sequential rather than in the iterative way (Mihm et al. 2003) . In this structure, the presence of the common third party k should reduce the likelihood of communication between teams j and i.
The previous discussion suggests that we should expect the influence of a common third party on the baseline tendency for two interdependent focal teams to communicate to vary with the position the third party occupies in its triadic structure. When the third party falls in the middle of a communication chain whose closure would result in a transitive triad, its presence is likely to amplify the awareness of the interdependence between the two focal teams and reduce any friction that may prevent the information exchange to take place, inducing the exchange of technical information about their interdependence.
Conversely, when the third party falls in the middle of a communication cycle whose closure is likely to be detrimental to this third party, the third party may have an incentive to encourage "freezing" the interdependence between the two focal teams to avoid changes that may cycle back and affect the third 
DATA AND METHODS
We test our predictions by studying the detailed design phase in the development of a large commercial aircraft engine. Figure 2 shows the product architecture and formal organizational structure of PW4098 engine. Figure 2 (a) is a cross-sectional diagram of the engine that shows the eight subsystems into which the 54 engine components were configured. Figure 2 (b) shows the (flat) formal organizational structure by which design teams were grouped into subsystems of teams, quasi-mirroring the engine architecture. We also captured network data associated with both the organization and the product. We captured the inter-team communication network of the 60 teams (54 design teams plus 6 functional teams) that designed the engine components and evaluated the overall engine performance as well as the technical interface network of the 54 components comprising the engine (Sosa et al. 2004 , Sosa et al. 2007 ). We collected data from multiple sources. Data on inter-team communications was gathered by interviewing and surveying key members of the teams (Marsden 1990 ). Product network data was constructed by interviewing several experienced engine architects.
Inter-team Communication Network Data
The informal communication network between the teams is defined by the presence or absence of taskrelated technical communication between any two of the 60 teams (i.e., 54 core design teams plus 6 functional teams) involved in the ten-month detailed design phase of the development process. Our focus on technical task-related interactions is akin to what Allen (1977) and Morelli et al. (1995) define as "coordination-type communication." The fact that the design of each engine component depends in complex ways on the design of some other components, and the stringent functional requirements of a product that needs to operate faultlessly in extreme conditions, highlights the importance of direct communication between teams to adequately understand the effects that design choices might have on product performance. Although we acknowledge that various types of inter-team technical information (Allen 1977 , McCord and Eppinger 1993 , Morelli et al. 1995 ) and important to avoid posing insurmountable cognitive hurdles to our respondents that could jeopardize the quality of the data.
We measured the presence of technical communication between teams through a questionnaire addressed to team leaders and validated (or revised, when necessary) their responses by interviewing at least one other key member of each team. Presentations describing the terminology and overall objective of the data collection were made in two sessions to more than two thirds of the respondents; the others were later briefed individually. Respondents were presented with the roster of the 54 design and 6 functional teams and asked to report if they had received non-trivial technical information from each of the other teams during the design phase of the project. Respondents were encouraged to focus on technical information exchanges that actually took place (i.e., "how it was", not "how it should have been") and that contributed to "fulfil the functional requirement of their component design or program goals" (Rowles 1999, p. 51) . We were able to obtain responses from 57 of the 60 teams. The three teams whose direct responses were missing were the interface team at Boeing (one of the six functional teams), one team in the High-pressure Compressor sub-system group, and one team in the Externals and Controls sub-system group. Yet because these teams were identified as information providers by other teams in the development process, we did not exclude them from the network. We estimated all our models excluding the three missing teams, and the results were consistent with the ones reported here. 
Product Network Data
Our product data capture the breakdown of the engine structure into eight subsystems and 54 components, as well as the five types of design dependencies among those components: spatial constraint, structural constraint due to transfer of loads, exchange of material, exchange of energy, and exchange of information, as identified by the system engineers. Even though such a detailed map of the product architecture was not available at the project's onset, design teams shared a common understanding of (i) the engine's division into subsystems and components and (ii) the relevant technical interfaces between their own components and the components designed by other teams. Each technical interface x ij is a 
Exogenous nodal variables:
Component redesign. An important factor that affects both a team's workload and the need to communicate with other interdependent teams is the novelty of the team's component. The more novel a component with respect to the prior generation, the more likely it will involve extra work for the team and the more likely it will affect interfaces with adjacent components. In contrast, components that carry over a significant portion of design content from previous engine models decrease the demand for attention to associated interfaces. We capture this factor by measuring component redesign as the percentage of novel design content in a component relative to its design in the product's previous version. Because it is impossible to determine the exact amount of redesign in a component, we relied on estimates provided by the team leader responsible for the design of each component.
Component complexity. Another component attribute that can affect the team's workload is its internal complexity. We measure a component's complexity in terms of its estimated number of distinct parts. For this estimate we relied on the experience of one of the authors, who is a design expert with substantial experience in similar engine programs and who also reviewed the design work for this particular project.
Component connectivity. This is simply the number of incoming and outgoing technical interfaces of each component in a dyad, irrespective of their strength. For each component, the measure simply counts the number of components with which it shares at least one design dependency, and it is thus equivalent to the "degree" of the component in the technical interface network.
Team size. The team's capacity to communicate with others might well be affected by resources available to the team. Because managers-when allocating resources to design teams-may take into account the workload entailed by component characteristics and by its interfaces with other engine components, the effects communication network structures may be confounded by the effects of the resources available to the team. To control for this possibility, we include a four-point ordinal variable that accounts for the manpower resources allocated to teams. Although we were unable to collect precise data on team size (which, in any case, varied throughout different stages of the process), we did obtain a qualitative assessment of team size based on the direct experience of one of the authors in the project.
Subsystem membership. Because each design team is formally assigned to a subsystem-level group, teams in the same group might share some characteristics that affect their ability to attend to technical interfaces. These teams will be also part of the same formal coordination structure, with their leaders reporting to the manager responsible for the subsystem. For instance, the seven teams that formed the fan group share technical expertise and experience relevant to the design of fan components, which is different from that of design teams responsible for components of the low-pressure compressor or highpressure turbine subsystems. On the organizational side, teams in the same subsystem group share a subsystem manager (responsible for planning and control of resources). All these factors create "silo" effects that foster communications between teams within a sub-system while hindering communications between design teams that belong to different sub-systems (Allen 1977 , Sosa et al. 2004 . To account for this, we created a categorical nodal variable that when entered in our statistical model allows us to control for whether any pair of design teams belong to the same subsystem group or not. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients of the continuous nodal variables used in our analysis.
Exogenous dyadic variables:
Technical interface strength. Our statistical modeling approach takes directly into account the effect of task interdependence as captured by the presence or not of technical interface going from component i to component j. In addition, we include a dyadic control for the strength of the technical interface which is equal to the sum of the non-zero directional dependencies from component j to i.
Number of common functional teams. As mentioned, the project studied included the participation of six functional teams which were not responsible for the design of any engine component. Hence, for the purpose of our analysis, we consider these teams to be exogenous to the core network of 54 design teams. Nonetheless, to account for the possible influence of these functional teams on the inter-team communication patterns of the 54 design teams we count the number of functional teams that act as common-third party teams between any pair of design teams i and j.
STATISTICAL NETWORK ANALYSIS
A standard tenet in network analysis is that the presence or absence of a relationship between two actors in a network is not independent of the structure of that same network. This endogenous nature of the statistical relationship between the network structure and the presence or absence of specific ties within this same network makes traditional statistical techniques inappropriate to test our hypotheses. Hence, we resort to exponential random graphs models (ERGMs), also known as p* models (refer to Lusher, Koskinen, and Robins 2013 for a comprehensive review). In essence, ERGMs allow for modeling an observed network-in our case, the binary network of technical communication among the 54 design teams-as a function of both exogenous (i.e., the attributes of both teams and components) and endogenous parameters (e.g., the number of ties, number of reciprocated ties, number of transitive triads in the communication network). This approach allows us to obtain reliable estimates of the effect of task interdependence on the probability of observing an inter-team communication tie as well as to examine As mentioned our model includes four types of parameters, which define the family of probability distributions that can generate the observed inter-team communication network. The coefficient parameters ( ! ) in the model are estimated to maximize the fit between the random networks and the observed data. Table 2 describes qualitatively each parameter included in the model and the tendency that it accounts for. Given the novelty of the cross-network triadic effects included in our models we describe the network statistics of such parameters in Table 2 . Table 2 describes 11 within inter-team communication network parameters that capture network configurations in a typical intra-organizational network (Contractor et al. 2006 , Rank et al. 2010 , Lomi et al. 2014 . Toward this end, we follow Robins et al. (2009) in specifying the various configurations in which both closure and two-path communications can occur because they capture the various ways in which common third party teams may influence the communication between a focal pair of design teams.
Table 2 also describes the cross-network effects included in our model. First, the "entrainment" of inter-team communication and technical interface between any pair of teams, which tests for the effect of task interdependence. Then, we describe two sets of cross-network triadic effects. The first set captures the overall tendency of a technical interface to be surrounded by common-third parties in the communication network. Because our network data is directed, there are four possible ways in which a common-third party can communicate with teams i and j whose components share a technical interface (Robins et al. 2009 ). As specified by their network statistics, this set of cross-network triads are simply controls in our models because they count the number of occurrence of such configurations in our data without capturing whether a communication between i and j takes place or not.
In order to account for the moderating effect of common-third parties on the effect of task interdependence we must define a second set of cross-network triadic statistics that accounts precisely for the four triadic configurations shown in Figure 1 . The network statistics of these triadic configurations are also included in Table 2 . Contrary to the network statistics of the cross-network triadic parameters described above, this second set of network statistics only accounts for the technical interface between i and j when is matched by the corresponding inter-team communication between i and j. 1 Estimating the coefficients for this latter set of triadic parameters allows us to test our key predictions. 2 Specifically, we expect to observe a positive coefficient for the effect of cross-network transitive closure (triad A in Figure   1 ) and a negative coefficient for the effect of cross-network cyclic closure (triad D in Figure 1 ).
Finally, Table 2 includes categorical and continuous node-and dyadic-level effects to capture whether exogenous factors such as the membership of a design team in one of the organizational project groups (a categorical nodal attribute), the complexity of the component a team is designing (a continuous nodal attribute), or the number of common functional teams between a pair of design teams (a dyadic attribute) influence the likelihood of a communication tie and of a entrainment tie.
1 The internal summation of these network statistics is defined up to N, where N = 54 so that the triadic configurations considers all 54 design teams as possible common third party between i and j. However, we can also set N = 60 to account the six functional teams as common third parties. Our results are robust to both specifications.
2 To estimate these effects we consider the two-path statistic associated with these triadic configurations (i.e., the internal summation of these network statistics) as an exogenous dyadic predictor. We then allow XPNet to estimate the interaction of such a dyadic predictor with the term ArcAB. Considering the two-path statistic as exogenous is in approximation necessary given the limitations of all existing software to estimate our full model. This is a good approximation, however, to the extent that all lower-order effects are included in our model. Table 2 for a visual description of these effects). Model 3 shows that there is a negative tendency for third-party teams to surround technical interfaces in a cyclic triad. Yet, this negative tendency becomes non-significant in the full model (Model 4). Model 3 also shows that there is a positive tendency for third-party teams to act as a common-receiver of information from the other two interdependent teams in the triad. These basic tendencies are important controls because they account for the overall tendencies for these four cross-network triadic configurations to form, but they do not test our predictions because they do not account for whether the focal interface is matched by its corresponding inter-team communication.
Model 4 tests how the local structure in which the common-third party team is embedded influences the effect of task interdependence on inter-team communication. To do so, the model includes four triadic effects that account for the four possible ways in which a common-third party team may interact with a pair of interdependent teams that exchange information in the same direction as their task interdependence (as shown in Figure 1 ). The coefficients associated with the tendency for triads B and C to form are not significant. This suggests that the presence of a common third party does not significantly moderate the effect of task interdependence on inter-team communication when this party is a commonrecipient or a common-source of information for the interdependent teams, which is consistent with our theorizing. As predicted, there is a positive and significant tendency for cross-network transitive closure (triad A in Figure 1 ) to form (0.223, p < 0.05). When the information flowing through the common-third party teams flows in the direction of the focal interface, the third party can facilitate the knowledge transfer between the interdependent teams, which reinforces the effect of task interdependence on the likelihood of communication. Also as predicted, Model 4 shows that there is a negative and significant tendency for cross-network cyclic closure to occur (triad D in Figure 1 ) to form (-0.235, p < .05) . This suggests that when a common third party is involved in a potentially cyclic triadic communication structure with two interdependent teams, the presence of this common third party may actually hinder the exchange of information between the interdependent teams, effectively "freezing" their interdependence.
Robustness
We test the robustness of our results in several ways. First, our results are robust to the exclusion of any of the exogenous nodal and dyadic effects, as well as to the exclusion of the four cross-network triadic effects that act as controls. Second, we estimated alternative models in which our key variables of interest (i.e., the cross-network closure variables) are calculated taking into account the communications with the six functional teams and the results are consistent with the ones presented in Table 3 . Third, we also estimated the cross-network closure variables considering only communications with the third-party team that were matched by the corresponding technical interface with the common-third party team. The results obtained with this alternative specification were also consistent with the ones presented here. Fourth, we also tested the robustness of our results with alternative specifications of the within-network effects. Our results are robust to the inclusion of Markov parameters for transitive and cyclic triads, as well as to the inclusion of social circuit effects with higher values of the λ parameter (we use λ = 2 in the models reported here). Finally, our results are also fully robust to the inclusion of a cross-network reciprocity effect (which is not significant in our models), as well as to the inclusion of four additional cross-network triadic effects that account for a focal pair of communicating teams and common-third parties in the technical interface network.
Goodness of fit Evaluation
We examined the goodness-of-fit of our ERGMs by comparing structural statistics of the observed network with the corresponding statistics on a sample of networks simulated from the fitted model (Hunter et al. 2008 , Robins et al. 2009 ). We built our sample out of 10 million simulated networks.
Using t-ratios
3 from such a sample we estimated whether the observed graph feature is extreme compared to the simulated distribution. As indicated by Robins et al (2009: 112) , "for effects explicitly [included] in the model, good convergence of the estimation algorithm is represented by [t-ratio] values close to zero (less than 0.1 is desirable). For an observed graph feature not included in the model, we decided that a t-ratio less than two in absolute value indicates that the observed feature is not unusual in the estimated graph distribution." Overall, all our models seem to provide a good fit to our data as indicated not only by the below 0.1 t-ratio of all the estimated parameters included in the models but also by the below 1.0 tratio of all additional structural parameters available in XPnet that were not included in our models. We also verified that the t-ratio of additional nodal and dyadic parameters that were not included in our models but were available in XPNet were not unsual in the estimated graph distribution. For Model 4, all such t-ratio were below 2.0.
Our models also seem to replicate well features that are not typically modeled such as degree distribution and clustering coefficient (Hunter et al. 2008 , Robins et al. 2009 ). For instance, in the full model (Model 4), the magnitudes of t-ratios for the standard deviations of both in-and out-degree distributions were less than 0.4, whereas the magnitude of the t-ratio for the skewedness of both in-and out-degree distributions were less than 1.0. For global and alternating clustering coefficients, the magnitudes of the t-ratios were less than 0.3. Overall, our models (and in particular Model 4) seem to be consistent with the observed data for the graph properties examined. All goodness-of-fit diagnostics carried out after extensive simulations are available from the authors upon request.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper considers whether the local structure of the informal inter-team communication networks in new product development organizations might affect the communication patterns between interdependent teams. While our findings show that task interdependence is a strong exogenous determinant of the communication network among design teams, we also show that this effect can be moderated by the presence of common third parties in this network. Our analysis of task interdependence and informal communication among the teams in charge of designing a major aircraft engine shows that the presence of a common third party in the informal communication network can affect the likelihood of communication between interdependent teams in different ways. While task interdependence creates incentives for two teams to exchange information, their communication with a common third party affects the likelihood that they will actually do so. The direction of the effect, however, is contingent on the position the common third party occupies in the local communication structure. When the common third party is positioned in the middle of a transitive triad so that its gets information from the potential source and it also sends information to the potential recipient, then the local structure enables the third party to be a facilitator of the information exchanged between the source and the receiver in the focal dyad. In such triads, the common third party may alleviate any friction associated with the exchange of knowledge between the source and the recipient McEvily 2003, Tortoriello et al. 2012) . In these local structures, Our study is based on comprehensive fieldwork that enabled us to collect rich quantitative and qualitative data on the technical interfaces between components of an extremely complex product as well as on the technical communication network among teams responsible for designing the components of that product. The independent measurement of task interdependence between teams-based on the observed technical interfaces between their respective components-provides a unique setting to investigate how the structure of the communication network that emerges to address those technical interfaces may itself moderate the effect of task interdependence in predicting inter-team communication.
Despite these advantages, the study has three limitations that result from the nature of our data.
First, our data on communication among teams captures only those exchanges that were explicitly related to technical matters. Hence, our communication network may fail to capture informal social interactions between members of different teams-that is, a social network that might exist in addition to the observed technical communication network. However, we remark that unobserved social exchanges could pose a problem for our study only if they are largely unrelated to the observed exchanges of technical communication. Such a possibility is not consistent with our qualitative observations of the communication patterns between teams, which suggest that it was rare for social exchanges to occur between teams that did not also communicate for technical reasons. This dynamic is consistent with the idea that teams are preoccupied with their work and hence that social interactions in organized settings will usually stem from encounters triggered by exogenous factors (in this case, interdependencies caused by shared interfaces). In sum, these considerations suggest that the lack of information on purely social exchanges between teams is unlikely to have biased our results. Also related to our measure of technical communication, our data does not allow us to make fine-grain distinctions among various types of technical communication. Unfortunately, given the complexity of the project studied, collecting the inter- the knowledge transferred is largely valued by the recipient), it is also true that such a directionality does not capture whether the communicating parties were engaged in a more or less bidirectional information exchanges. Having said this, and given the strong tendencies for reciprocation in the communication network featured in this study, it is possible that many of the communications were indeed two-way communications. Fortunately, we were able to control for the underlying tendency to reciprocate communication ties in our analysis.
Third, our findings show how the structure of the communication network might affect the behaviors of design teams involved in a complex new product development project, but we cannot say anything regarding the desirability or undesirability of such behaviors. A possible interpretation of our findings is that, given the complexity of the technical interfaces in the PW4098 engine, some teams might have consciously neglected to attend some interdependencies (in cyclic triads) to focus on other, more critical ones, as a way to allocate team resources more efficiently. Two elements raise doubts about this interpretation, however. First, additional post-hoc analysis (not reported here) did not reveal a significant association between mismatched interfaces in the presence of a common third party and the strength of the mismatched technical interface. Second, anecdotal evidence from our research site suggests that some mismatched interfaces did cause significant rework in subsequent stages of the process. Although we lack systematic data in this respect, these qualitative observations are fully consistent with the results of Gokpinar et al. (2010) , which found a significant association between lack of communication about technical interfaces and quality issues in the automobile industry.
Despite this evidence, we cannot say that teams were "talking too little" with other teams, as it is indeed possible that omissions to establish a direct communication between two interdependent teams could have been sometimes an efficient way to use scarce team resources. Neither can we say that they were "talking too much." While our data does show instances of communication in the absence of technical interfaces, which are disproportionally present within group boundaries in the formal organizational structure, such communication cannot be dismissed as superfluous, because it might have addressed unobserved technical interfaces that were uncovered during the design process or other types of task-related interdependencies not directly traceable to physical interfaces between components. What our results do show is that although the technical interface network largely determines the presence or absence of communication between design teams, deviations from this overall tendency are systematically associated with specific triadic configurations in the structure of the communication network among the teams.
Despite their limitations, our findings have important practical implications for managers seeking to improve the coordination between design teams in complex product development projects. While our study confirms the salience of task interdependence in prompting informal exchanges of technical communication between teams, we also identify situations that can significantly alter this association.
This is important because managers (and engineering scholars) often assume that technical interdependence should automatically trigger the communication necessary to coordinate design tasks (Cataldo et al. 2006 , Olson et al. 2009 ). Managers are aware of the unintended effect of formal organizational boundaries in hindering communication between actors that sit across such boundaries.
However, the possibility that informal communication networks-often touted as a remedy to the failure of formal organization-would also have unintended consequences that may increase the risk of coordination disruptions in product development projects has not been considered. In particular, the possibility that the presence of a common third party that participates in potentially cyclic communication patterns can reduce the likelihood of other teams communicating to coordinate their interdependence should prompt managers to pay special attention to identify and manage actors that are likely involved in cycles in the communication network (Sosa et al. 2013 ). The consequences of not doing so may be significant. Even minor disruptions in coordination may lead to design inadequacies that, although not critical, could affect the performance or durability of the affected components and subsystems, causing significant warranty or service expenses over the life of the product. For example, if a critical component of an aircraft engine (e.g., a turbine airfoil) fails to reach its life expectancy, this will cause additional engine removals for maintenance. For an engine like the PW4098, a single such removal could cost the customer as much as $150,000, in addition to the loss of revenues associated with a grounded plane.
To conclude we refer to Simon (1996) who suggested that a complex system is difficult to understand because the behavior of the whole depends in nontrivial ways on how its elements interact. In studying the determinants of inter-team communications when designing a complex system, we have learned that common third-party teams have a significant moderating influence on the predictive power of the patterns of task interdependence. We have shown that our results have important implications for both theory and practice. They also raise a number of interesting questions. How does the presence of common third parties to a focal technical interface influence the ability of interdependent teams to discover and 
